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Armgardt: Wrongful Death - Siblings as Beneficiaries under Wyoming's Wrongf

Wrongful Death-Siblings as Beneficiaries Under Wyoming's Wrongful
Death Statutes. Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055 (Wyo. 1984).
Daniel Ray Wetering died on May 17, 1982, when his motorcycle
slammed into a school bus. The bus was approaching from the opposite
direction, and when the bus driver, Sylvia Eisele, turned left into Wetering's path, Wetering had no time to avoid crashing into the bus. There
were no other injuries. Wetering was twenty-one years old, and he left
surviving his father, mother, one brother, and four sisters.'
The deceased's father, Darel Lloyd Wetering, was appointed Administrator of the Estate,2 and be subsequently filed a wrongful death
claim against Laramie County School District No. 1 and the State of
Wyoming. The complaint alleged that Daniel Ray Wetering's death was
the direct result of the wrongful and negligent act of an employee of the
defendants. Claiming damages were the decedent's father, mother, brother
and four sisters.'
The defendants filed a Motion to Strike the siblings as claimants, arguing that Wyoming's wrongful death statutes4 limit recovery to the decedent's spouse, children and parents.' The District Court of Laramie County
granted the defendants' motion!
The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed, stating that the siblings in
this case were entitled to recover for wrongful death. The court held that
1. Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055, 1057 (Wyo. 1984). See also Brief of Appellant
at 5, Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055 (Wyo. 1984) [hereinafter Brief of Appellant].
2. The claim was filed in accordance with the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act,
Wvo. STAT. § 1-39-113 (Supp. 1984).

3. Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 3.
4. WYo. STAT. § 1-38-101 (Supp. 1984) provides:
Whenever the death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect or default
such as would have entitled the party injured to maintain an action to recover
damages if death had not ensued, the person who would have been liable if
death had not ensued is liable in an action for damages, even though the death
was caused under circumstances as amount in law to murder in the first or
second degree or manslaughter. If the person liable dies, the action may be
brought against the executor or administrator of his estate. If he left no estate
within the state of Wyoming, the court may appoint an administrator upon
application.
Wvo. STAT. § 1-38-102 (Supp. 1984) provides:
(a) Every such action shall be brought by and in the name of the personal
representative of the deceased person.
(b) If the deceased left a husband, wife, child, father or mother, no debt of the
deceased may be satisfied out of the proceeds of any judgment obtained in
any action brought under the provisions of this section.
1c) The court or jury, as the case may be, in every such action may award such
damages, pecuniary and exemplary, as shall be deemed fair and just. Every
person for whose benefit such action is brought may prove his respective
damages, and the court or jury may award such person that amount of damages
to which it considers such person entitled, including damages for loss of probable future companionship, society and comfort.
(d) Every such action shall be commenced within two (2)years after the death
of the deceased person.
5. Brief of Appellant, supra note 1, at 3.
6. Wetering, 682 P.2d at 1057.
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every claimant's right to damages is governed by the Wyoming intestacy
statute. Wetering's siblings prevailed in court only because their brother
had neither a wife nor children.8

BACKGROUND

The Statute
The Wyoming wrongful death statutes were enacted in 18719 in the
wake of Parliament's passage of Lord Campbell's Act in 1846,10 and similar
stateside laws designed to provide a remedy for families of wrongfully
killed persons." Wrongful death compensation was unknown at common
law," so these statutes were formulated to redress the inequity of it being more profitable for a tortfeasor to kill his victim than merely injure
im.13

The 1871 acts remained basically intact through the years,'" and
featured such key elements as:
(1) permitting a cause of action if the victim, had he lived, would
have been able to sue for damages,
(2) vesting the cause of action in the name of a personal
representative,
(3) distributing a lump sum award according to intestacy laws,
(4) protecting the award from creditors' claims,
(5) establishing a two-year Statute of Limitations, and
(6) instructing the jury to award "fair and just compensation."' 5
The only significant alterations in this typical statutory scheme 6 occurred
in 1973, when the Wyoming legislature:
(1) eradicated the reference to the intestacy laws as a tool for
disseminating damages,
(2) allowed "every person for whose benefit such action is
brought" to prove his or her respective damages,
7. Id at 1062.
8. WYo. STAT. § 2-4-101 (Supp. 1984) provides that if there is no spouse, children, nor
descendents of children, then the decedent's father, mother, brothers and sisters share in
the decedent's intestate estate.
9. LAWS OF WYOMING, 1871, at 88. See also subsequent codifications of the laws listed
in Annot., WYo. STAT. §§ 1-38-101 to -102 (Supp. 1984).
10. Lord Campbell's Act (Fatal Accidents Act), 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93; see also W.
PROSSER AND W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 127, at 945 (W. Keeton ed. 1984).

11. 1 SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 1.9, at 29 (2d ed. 1975).
12. Barker v. Bolton, 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808). For a history of common law development, see generally Smedley, Wrongful Death-Basesof the Common Law
Rules, 13 VAND. L. REV. 605 (1960).
13. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 127, at 902 (4th ed. 1971).
14. See supra note 9.
15. See, e.g., WYO. STAT., §§ 1-1065, -1066

(1957).

16. For a comparison of the various provisions of each statute, see generally, Comment,
Wrongful Death Damages in North Carolina, 44 N.C.L. REV. 402 (1966).
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(3) exempted from creditors' claims only those damages awarded to the decedent's husband, wife, child (or children), father, or
mother, and
(4) quantified recoverable compensation as including loss of
pecuniary services, and loss of "future companionship, society and
comfort. "'v
The Case Law
Defining the beneficiary class in Wyoming wrongful death suits was
relatively simple until 1973. Since the intestacy statute expressly provided
the structure for award distribution, prior to 1973 one finds a pronounced
dearth of case law directly on point. One Wyoming case did interpret the
statutes as creating a new cause of action,'" as opposed to the right existing in a survival statute. 19 Other noteworthy cases designated damage
awards as independent of the decedent's estate and his debts, 20 declared
that an action could be brought only by the decedent's personal representative for the benefit of those entitled to share in an intestate's personal
estate, 1 extinguished and then revived the right of action upon the death
of the tortfeasor 2 2 and limited the personal
representative's role to that
23
of a mere trustee for the survivors.
The first meaningful discussion of sibling eligibility for wrongful death
awards in Wyoming was by Justice Blume in Coliseum Motel Co. v.
Hester.24 The opinion surveyed the history and current state of wrongful
death actions, and held that wrongful death creates an independent cause
of action for the benefit of the survivors. The court further asserted that
judgments should completely compensate for loss of companionship as
well as for pecuniary loss. While recognizing the intestacy statute boundaries existing in Wyoming, Justice Blume suggested that compensation
should be doled out according to the facts of each case. 5 Thus, Blume
advocated, siblings should be allowed to recover under the proper circumstances.
17. 1973 Wyo. SEss. LAWS, ch. 139. "An act to amend section 1-1066 of the statutes
relating to wrongful death actions; and modifying distribution of proceeds of judgment from
such actions." (Emphasis added).
18. Coliseum Motor Co. v. Hester, 43 Wyo. 298, 304, 3 P.2d 105, 108 (1931).
19. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Hale, 247 Iowa 1194, 78 N.W.2d 509 (1956).
20. Tuttle v. Short, 42 Wyo. 1, 18, 288 P. 524, 529 (1930). The 1973 amendment protects from creditors' claims only those awards to the decedent's husband, wife, child, father,
or mother.
21. Ashley v. Read Constr. Co., 195 F. Supp. 727, 728 (D. Wyo. 1961).
22. Tuttle, 42 Wyo. at 18, 28 P. at 529, overruled in part, Parsons v. Roussalis, 488
P.2d 1050 (Wyo. 1971).
23. Coliseum, 43 Wyo. at 311, 3 P.2d at 108.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 319, 3 P.2d at 111-12. Justice Blume stated:
But it has been recognized by the courts that, except, perhaps, under exceptional circumstances, collateral or remoter relatives should not be considered,
or considered only to a limited extent, in this connection.... In Kelley v. Irr.
.& 0. Co., 30 Idaho 778, 168 P. 1076, 1078, the court said: "A rule which bars
collateral heirs, in all cases, from recovering damages for loss of society and
companionship does not strike me as just or sensible, and we find no basis for
such a rule in the statute.... Each case must stand on its particular facts."
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The keystone case in enumerating the wrongful death beneficiary class
in view of the 1973 statutory amendments was Jordan v. Delta Drilling
Company." The Wyoming Supreme Court held that an illegitimate child
is a "person" within the meaning of the phrase, "every person for whose
benefit such action is brought."2 7 The court thus interpreted "every person" as an open-ended class. Justice and the community's sense of values
would dictate who could share in wrongful death awards. The list of whose
claims were to be insulated from creditors would not determine the full
beneficiary class. 2 8 Similarly, the court recognized that the 1973 amendment evidenced clear legislative intent to repudiate any analogy to intestacy laws. 9
The court abruptly retreated from the liberal statutory construction
characterizing Jordanin the second major post-1973 amendment case, Saffels v. Bennett.30 The court held that an ex-wife, owed alimony payments
by the decedent, did not qualify as a wrongful death claimant. The court
31
declared that the Jordanholding was to be interpreted very narrowly.
It proclaimed that the history of subsection (b) of section 1-38-102 of the
Wyoming statutes reflected legislative intent to limit "every person"
beneficiaries to spouses, parents and children of the deceased.32 Finally,
26. 541 P.2d 39 (Wyo. 1975).
27. Id. at 48. "An illegitimate child is a 'person' within the scope of § 1-1066 .
28. Id. at 42-43. The court stated:
Nor can we say that the language of § 1-1066(b) requires distribution under
the laws of intestacy. It states only that when a decedent leaves a husband,
wife, child, father or mother, any wrongful death action recovery shall not be
liable for any debts of the deceased. The qualifications of the person for whom
recovery is sought are those which may establish to the jury an entitlement
to a fair and just award of damages. No more. We cannot amend the law to
add more that what is clearly said and enlarge, stretch, expand or extend a
statute to matters not falling within its express provisions.
29. Id.at 43. The court stated:
The legislature, by amendment deleting any reference to the laws of distribution of a decedent's estate, has eliminated any question of a relationship between heirship and entitlement to damages. Generally, when the legislature,
by amendment, has deleted an express provision of a statute, the presumption is that a change was intended.
30. 630 P.2d 505 (Wyo. 1981).
31. Id. at 509. The court stated:
The Jordan case simply held that an illegitimate child was within the class
of person for whom the action for wrongful death could be brought. The illegitimate child is a child within the words used in § 2-14-202(b) ...and the
intent to include an illegitimate child within those to be benefitted by the act
is there expressed. There is no such expression with reference to a divorced wife.
Note the court's switch from identifying an illegitimate child as a "person" in Jordan to
a "child" in Saffels.
32. Saffels v. Bennett, 630 P.2d 505, 509 (1975). The court said:
The legislative history of § 1-38-102(b) reflects the intention of the legislature
to not stray from the traditional rule of beneficiary dependence to the extent
propounded by appellant and suggested in the dissent hereto. As originally
introduced, subsection (b) provided: "If the deceased left a husband, wife, child,
father, mother, brother, sister, or child or children of a deceased child, no debt
of the deceased may be satisfied out of the proceeds of any judgment obtained
in any action brought under the provisions of this section."
The House Judiciary Committee recommended deletion of the words
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after some semantical discussion of the meaning of "every person,"3 1 the
court voiced fears of an endless34 parade of claimants if "every person" were
assigned its literal meaning.
THE PRINCIPAL CASE

In Wetering, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that this decedent's
siblings were valid wrongful death claimants. The district court had
grounded its holding on dictum in Saffels restricting the meaning of "every
person," 3 while disregarding the expansive beneficiary class created in
Jordan.Faced with such contradictory precedent, the Wyoming Supreme
Court felt compelled to discuss, and finally disapprove of, conflicting
3
"
language in both Saffels and Jordan.
The defendants in the instant case brandished the strict statutory construction line of Saffels, and asserted that the House Judiciary Committee's deletion of siblings in subsection (b) of section 1-38-102 of the Wyoming statutes mandates their exclusion from recovery." The plaintiffs
wielded the invitation extended to anyone to prove his or her damages
found in Jordan, and attempted to define "every person" as members of
a distinct class of blood kin entitled to recover. 8
The Wetering court found neither precedent nor counsels' arguments
persuasive. The court first recognized the inconsistencies between its two
earlier progeny, then apologetically stated that it "overwrote" in both
instances.3 9 Proceeding from a clean slate, then, the court employed
statutory construction"0 and the legislative history of the creditor claim
portion of the wrongful death statutes4' to facilitate its decision.
After noting Wyoming's tradition (prior to 1973) of utilizing intestacy
statutes to delineate wrongful death beneficiaries, the court pronounced
that "when the legislature dropped from the wrongful death act in 1973
the identification of those persons for whose benefit the action was brought
of the statute providing for intestate
it must have assumed the application
42
descent and distribution."
Major weight was placed on case law ascribing to the legislature
knowledge of the existing state of the law, thereby requiring statutory
"brother, sister, or child or children of a deceased child," and the bill was so

amended.
The legislative intention thus expressed was to limit the recipients of
benefits to be derived from the statute.
33. Id. at 510.
34. Id.
35. Wetering, 682 P.2d at 1057.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 1062.
Brief of Appellees at 4-5, Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055 (Wyo. 1984).
Brief of Appellants, supra note 1, at 7, 10.
Wetering, 682 P.2d at 1059.
Id. at 1061.
Id. at 1061-62.
Id. at 1061.
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construction in harmony with the existing law.4'3 The existing law referred
to was use of the probate code to define the wrongful death beneficiary
class. Also persuasive to the court was that full force and effect must be
appointed to all language of the statutes. Finding that the legislature intended that the beneficiary class could include others besides the deceased's spouse, children, or parents, the court concluded that judgments
should be distributed according to the probate code." Thus, claimants cannot recover unless their compensation is directed by the intestacy statute.

ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION

The result in Wetering is desirable, but the court's reasoning is marred
by contradictions and fears of establishing progressive, yet logical, legal
precedent. The court's bewildering resort to the probate code defies
legislative intent, and ignores modem notions of reasonably complete relief
for the wrongful death of a loved one. Unfortunately, this case exemplifies
the court's continued failure to interpret the 1973 amendment in a consistent or coherent manner.
Initially, Jordan defined the beneficiary class as including any person who could prove damages.45 Analogy to the probate code was expressly
renounced.46 Next, Saffels foreclosed recovery to anyone but the spouse,
children, or parents of the decedent.'4 There was no mention of the probate code. Finally, Wetering re-adopted the intestacy laws' framework for
determining who can recover for wrongful death.'4
The implementation of the probate code, which injects a large dose
of certainty into naming wrongful death beneficiaries, belies a court exasperated with its record. Numerous jurisdictions rely on intestacy laws
for guidance in wrongful death
actions, but few if any have done so in
49
such an inconsistent fashion.
Statutory Construction
At least three inconsistencies in the statutory construction in Wetering strengthen the impression of a court surrendering to the security of
the probate code. First, the court assumed the legislature was aware of
the existing state of the law. 0 It then assumed the legislature erred in
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Jordan v. Delta Drilling Co., 541 P.2d 39, 42-43 (Wyo. 1975).
46. Id. at 42.
47. Saffels, 630 P.2d at 509.
48. Wetering, 682 P.2d at 1061.
49. Comment, supra note 16, at 423. See generaUy 2 SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL
DEATH § 10.1, at 122 (2d ed. 1975).
50. Wetering, 682 P.2d at 1061. The court said: "When the legislature adopts a statute
it is presumed to have done so with full knowledge of the existing state of law with reference
to the subject matter of the statute."
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1973 when it deleted references to the probate code. 1 Second, the court
supposed that the legislature intended a change by its 1973 amendment, 2
but held that the legislature did not mean to alter the class of
beneficiaries. 6 Third, the court said it could not find a provision which
would transform the old rule of intestacy-statute dependence,"1 while ignoring the fact that the legislature by deleting its reference rejected the
probate code.5 5 One wonders how much more explicitly the legislature must
act to have its intent effectuated.
The court erred in presuming that the legislature removed the probate code reference while intending to retain its effect.5 6 The proper
statutory construction would give effect to the statute itself, without
assuming the legislature inadvertently omitted the probate code reference.57 Legislative purpose is the primary consideration in ascertaining
the meaning of a statute,5 8 and withdrawal of the probate code analogy
should have invoked the presumption that the legislature intended a
change. 9 Besides, over-narrow meanings should not be applied to statutes
in disregard of obvious legislative intent for a broader reading of the
statute.65 Finally, the court construed the wrongful death statutes and
6
the intestacy statute in pari matewia,
' yet this was inappropriate in light
62
of a clear legislative mandate.

51. Id. The court stated: "We are satisfied, however, that when the legislature dropped from the wrongful death act in 1973 the identification of those persons for whose benefit
the action was brought it must have assumed the application of the statute providing for
intestate descent and distribution."
52. Id. The court said: "We further must assume that the legislature did not intend
futile acts and that its amendment of the statute indicated some change in the existing law
was intended."
53. Id. The court stated: "[Tihe legislature did not intend to change the persons for
whose benefit an action in wrongful death could be maintained."
54. Id. at 1061-62. The court said: "Since no provision which has the effect of adjusting
that rule can be found in the statute, the reference to every person for whose benefit such
action is brought must continue to invoke the intestacy provisions of the probate code."
55. Jordan, 541 P.2d at 42.

56. Albany County Weed and Pest Dist. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 592 P.2d 1154,
1157 (Wyo. 1979); Brown v. State, 590 P.2d 1312, 1314 (Wyo. 1979.
57. Wyoming Dep't of Educ. v. Barber, 649 P.2d 681, 684-85 (Wyo. 1982); People v.
Fremont Energy Corp., 651 P.2d 802, 807 (Wyo. 1982). See also 1A SANDS, SUTHERLAND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 22.32, at 186 (4th ed. 1972).
58. State v. Stovall, 648 P.2d 543, 545 (Wyo. 1982); Sanches v. Sanches, 626 P.2d 61,
62 (Wyo. 1981).
59. DeHerrera v. Herrera, 565 P.2d 479, 483 (Wyo. 1971); Kosmicki v. Swick, 468 P.2d
818, 821 (Wyo. 1970).
60. People v. Platte Pipe Line Co., 649 P.2d 208, 212 (Wyo. 1982); Nimmo v. State,
603 P.2d 386, 390 (Wyo. 1979).
61. "Upon the same matter or subject. Statutes in pari rnateriaare to be construed
together. 'Statutes in pan materia' are those relating to the same person or thing or having
a common purpose." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 711 (5th ed. 1979).
All portions of an act must be read in pari materia, Haddenham v. City of Laramie,
648 P.2d 551 (Wyo. 1982), but the wrongful death statutes and the intestacy statutes are
in different acts.
62. In re Parental Rights of SCN, 659 P.2d 568,573 (Wyo. 1983); Wyoming In-Stream
Flow Comm. v. Thompson, 651P.2d 778, 782 (Wyo. 1982).
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History and Policy
The court failed to appreciate the significance of legislative inaction
since 1973. This should have indicated to the court that the legislature
indeed intended abolition of the probate code as a reference in wrongful
death actions, and that it was pleased with the results of the amendment.
One can assume that the legislature would have amended the statute after
Jordan if it really meant to retain use of the probate code. 3
The court should have drawn guidance from the Wyoming statutes'
progressive framework for compensating, within reason, every person's
loss of future companionship, society, and comfort.61 The inclusion of these
damages evidences clear legislative intent to create a compensation right
independent of pecuniary damages. 5 If there are two types of damages,
in all likelihood there are two main types of claimants: those who would
seek damages for pecuniary loss or pecuniary loss and loss of companionship, and those who would seek damages for loss of companionship only.
Siblings generally would be included in this latter class.
A broad interpretation of "every person for whose benefit such action is brought" comports with modern trends and policies. For example,
the decedent's siblings are included the statutes of nine states.66 Laws
which designate the beneficiary class as "next of kin" unanimously denote
siblings as members of the class. 7 Other statutes, which define the beneficiary class as "heirs" or "heirs at law," generally have been construed
to include siblings.68
Although in the past drafters of wrongful death statutes have been
quite timid in providing compensation, 69 today courts and legislatures appear willing to liberally construe statutes to effect the action's overall purpose of dispensing relief to injured parties. 0 Other cases exemplifying the
modern trend and the common law maxim, "for every wrong, a remedy,"
63. Smith v. City of Detroit, 388 Mich. 637, 650, 202 N.W.2d 300, 304 (1972).

64. WYo. STAT. § 1-38-102 (Supp. 1984).
65. Id.
66. SPEISER, supra note 49, § 10.18. See generally, Annot., 31 A.L.R. 3D 379 (1980).
67. Id.

68. Id. Some states employ a tiered recovery system akin to that established by Wyoming's intestacy statute. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1055 (1971); see also Comment, Recovery
for Wrongful Death, 34 OKLA. L. REV. 659 (1981); see Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.080 (1979); see
also Comment, Missouri's New Wrongful Death Statute-Highlightsof Some Significant

Changes,45 Mo. L. REv. 476 (1980).
69. W. PROSSER, supra note 13, § 127.
70. See, e.g., Crystal v. Hubbard, 44 Mich. 297, 324 N.W.2d 869 J1982), in which the
siblings of a decedent killed in an auto accident were allowed to recover. The court held that
the statute, allowing recovery by next of kin, which was defined as a class entitled to inherit
personal property of decedent had he died intestate, was intended by the legislature to apply to a broad class of potential heirs, including siblings. The court did not limit recovery
to actual heirs at law, in light of fundamental notions of distributive justice, the legislature's
adoption of lost companionship as a measure of damages, the legislature's acquiescence in
prior judicial expressions of the standard adopted, and arbitrary results which a contrary
interpretation would produce.
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have awarded loss of consortium damages to unmarried cohabitants," and
wrongful death damages to parents of a stillborn fetus. 2 In contrast, the
Wetering decision seems regressive and contrary to modern policy.
The Court's Surmountable Concerns
The Wyoming Supreme Court in Wetering may have been motivated
by some legitimate yet surmountable concerns. The court appeared unduly result-oriented
while restricted by a fear of opening the floodgates
7
of litigation. 1
Without retreating to intestacy guidelines, however, the court could
have designated only blood kin eligible for recovery. Or the court might
have delivered a limited holding applicable only to siblings, while also certifying the validity of claims by spouses, children and parents of the decedent. Or the court could have trusted juries to discard silly claims, 4 allowing "every person" an opportunity to "prove his respective damages."
The court also may have been leery of legislating by judicial decree.
This is a valid concern, but avoidable by the proper use of statutory interpretation, which ascribes the statute its literal meaning. Besides,
reinstating the probate code as a reference after it was deleted by the
legislature resembles an unexcusable exercise of judicial legislation.
The prospect of unreasonably large monetary awards,' also may have
prompted the court to tightly circumscribe the class of beneficiaries.
Astronomical jury awards arguably are not congruous with the requirement that awards be "fair and just.' 6 Yet, outrageous judgments can
be prevented by the good sense of juries which set the awards, and by
an appellate courts' prerogative to trim excessive jury awards. Another
approach involves legislative action,
whereby non-pecuniary loss could
7
be limited to a maximum amount.
Whatever the court's apprehensions, it did succeed in making the
wrongful death beneficiary class extremely easy to ascertain. The intestacy
71. Bulloch v. United States, 487 F. Supp. 1078 (D.N.J. 1980). See also Comment, Extending ConsortiumRights to UnmarriedCohabitants-Bullochv. U.S., 129 U. PA. L. REv.
911 (1981).
72. Salazar v. St. Vincent Hosp., 95 N.M. 150, 619 P.2d 826 (1980). See also Comment,
Wrongful Death and the Stillborn Fetus:A Common Law Solution to a StatutoryDilemma,43

U. PITT. L. REv. 819 (1981-82).
73. See Saffels v. Bennett, 630 P.2d 505, 510 (Wyo. 1981).
74. Id at 513 (Raper, J., dissenting).
75. See, e.g., Spangler v. Helm's New York-Pittsburgh Motor Express, 396 Pa. 482,
153 A.2d 490 (1959) (award of $46,059 for loss of mother's companionship, comfort, society,
guidance, solace, and protection). Very few jurisdictions use special verdicts, so it is difficult
to determine how much of an award is not compensating pecuniary loss. Large general verdicts, however, do provide an indication that loss of companionship can be recompensed handsomely. See Jeffrey v. United States, 381 F. Supp. 505 (D. Ariz. 1974) ($135,000 for death
of eight-year-old son); Metropolitan Dade County v. Dillon, 305 So. 2d 36 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1974) ($900,000 for death of six-year-old daughter).
76. WYo. STAT. § 1-38-102(c) (Supp. 1984).
77. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1903 to -1904 (1976). For a discussion supporting
the Kansas approach, see Comment, Damages for Wrongful Death in Kansas: Some Problems, Questions and Answers, 17 WAsHaLaN L.J. 73 (1977).
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statute8 is very explicit. It can, however, lead to unfortunate results. For
example, suppose a decedent left surviving his parents, an estranged wife,
and a child. Whether the wife opts to sue or not, the parents have no right
of recovery3 9 In the instant case, the fact that the decedent may have
been married does not mean the siblings did not also suffer a loss. The
Wetering decision thus can expand the beneficiary class from that
delineated in Saffels. Collateral relatives now have a chance to recover,
if there is no spouse or children. Clearly, it can also contract the beneficiary
class defined in Saffels. Meanwhile, only legislative amendment or radical
judicial adjusting can resurrect the beneficiary class outlined in Jordan.
This would re-align Wyoming wrongful death law with modern perceptions of compensation.
CONCLUSION

The overall purpose of the Wyoming wrongful death statutes, the early
case law, the structure of the act itself, the proper statutory interpretation, and the modern policy illustrate that the Wyoming legislature intended to provide a complete remedy for damages. Use of the probate code
to focus "every person" into a quantifiable group was unwarranted and
unwise. The statutes now cannot operate as intended. The court should
have ruled that "every person" who could prove loss of a strong emotional
bond with the decedent is entitled to "loss of companionship" damages.
Justice would be administered according to circumstances, while claims
from the likes of the decedent's business partner or mailman would be
readily discarded. The statutes must be amended or the judiciary must
re-examine this case before the wrongful death remedy functions properly in Wyoming.
CHARLES

78. WYo.
79. Id.

STAT.
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§ 2-4-101 (Supp. 1984).
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